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Introduction 
This paper discusses the extent to which international 
relations theories, which are mainly based on the behavior 
and interest of the big powers, explain the international 
behavior of small states. In order to do so, four different 
theories that are most commonly used to explain the 
international behavior of small states are reviewed briefly. 
Bhutan’s international affairs, emphasizing on its relations 
with India is described and explanations provided using these 
theories. These theories predict that other small states would 
behave in a similar manner. To test this, Bhutan’s relation 
with India is compared with the relation between Nepal and 
India. Nepal’s relations with India differ from that of 
Bhutan’s. This difference is empirically supported by their 
voting behavior in the United Nations. The exiting theories fail 
to explain different relations of two similar states vis-à-vis a 
big neighbour. Some alternative explanations have been 
provided. The paper concludes by emphasizing that no 
existing international relations theories explain the behavior 
of small states. More studies incorporating cultural, political 
and social characteristics and involving foreign policy experts 
of small states are suggested.  
A Review of International Relations Theories Related to Small 
States 
There is a wide consensus among scholars and students of 
international relations that are interested in small states that 
the small states have been ignored by the prevailing 
international relations theories. In very limited instances 
where international politics of small states are mentioned, the 
                                              
∗ This paper was written as a research assignment in December 
2001 at Stanford University, California, 
+ Researcher, The Centre for Bhutan Studies  
                                                    International Politics of Bhutan             
 91
states are described as small are so only relative to their 
neighbours or larger powers with which they are compared. 
For example, in Power and Interdependence, Keohane and 
Nye discuss the asymmetric relationship between the US on 
the one hand and Canada and Australia on the other. 
Australia and Canada are small only when compared to the 
US. Apart from the issue of differences in sizes of the states, 
there are several other dimensional differences that 
characterize global politico-economic system. There is an 
international hierarchy of growing complexities, 
discontinuities, and inequalities (Fauriol, 1984. 12-13).  
 
One of the most common theories used to explain 
international policies of small states is structural scarcity 
theory. It emphasizes that the lack of economic and military 
capabilities constrain the behavior of small sates. They are 
dependent on the states that have these capabilities (Vogel. 
1983. 58). (in Holl ed.) 
 
The concept of bandwagoning is other most commonly used 
theory to explain international behavior of small states 
(Väyrynen, 1997. 46). (in Inbar & Seffer ed) It is stated that 
that in a situation of threat small states will almost always 
align with the threatening power.  
 
There are two other theories that have been used to study 
behavior of small states. First one is the world systems 
analysis and it emphasizes the economic dynamics of the 
entire international system. According to this theory, the 
world is divided into a three-layer hierarchy of core, semi-
periphery and periphery. It is believed when the world’s 
economy expands, it contributes productive power of the 
hegemonic core, which in turn enables substantial 
penetration into the periphery. It also states that in the long 
run, there will be rivalry among the core powers, leading to 
protectionist and bilateral trading arrangements. This enables 
the peripheral states to exercise economic independence. 
(Väyrynen, 1983. 90) (in Holl ed). The second one is the 
dependency school. It distinguishes states into dominant and 
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dominated. It is believed that the dominant states penetrate 
with transnational economic forces into the economies and 
polities of smaller states. (Väyrynen, 1983. 83) (in Holl ed). 
Given these theories, let us now discuss the international 
policies of Bhutan and try to see if the above theories explain 
them.  
Bhutan’s International Politics 
Bhutan emerged out of self-imposed isolation in the early 
1960s. Except for a few contacts with Tibet and British India, 
it did not have contacts with other countries earlier. Since 
then, Bhutan has cautiously and gradually joined the 
international community of nations and organizations. 
 
Right from the beginning, Bhutan’s international politics has 
been characterized by its close and intimate relationship with 
India. It agreed to be advised by India in international affairs. 
A treaty to this effect was signed in 1949 (Rose 1977, 77), 
before the country abandoned its isolation, but took on 
importance only after 1961. Formal diplomatic relations 
between Bhutan and India at the ambassadorial level were 
established in 1978. However, cooperation between the two 
countries started much earlier. Bhutan launched its first five-
year plan in 1961. The first two five-year plans were 
exclusively financed by India. Construction of roads 
constituted the main component of Indian assistance. Later 
on it also included construction of schools, hospitals and 
agricultural centers. Today, Indian assistance to Bhutan is 
largely in hydropower industry. Apart from economic 
assistance, India also provides military assistance to Bhutan. 
It provides basic training to the Bhutanese armed force 
personnel. On the political front, the two countries enjoy a 
very stable relationship. Although the political leadership and 
the governing parties change fairly frequently in India, the 
two countries have not had any political differences. They 
share membership in several multilateral and regional 
organizations. Although Bhutan has neither the capacity nor 
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the intention to develop nuclear weapons, it has supported 
India’s nuclear policies.  
 
The maintenance of a very close and intimate relationship 
with India does not mean that Bhutan took India into a total 
trust. Bhutan has always been aware of the asymmetries 
between the two. In order to counter this feeling of insecurity, 
Bhutan has been diversifying its international relations, 
Bhutan applied for membership in a number of international 
organizations and gradually became a member of them. It was 
admitted to the United Nations in 1971. The UN opened a 
United Nations Development Program office in Thimphu in 
1979. Bhutan is now a member of more than 150 
international organisations. In addition, diversification of its 
international relationships also took the form of expansion of 
bilateral relations with other countries, mostly with small 
countries that share similar experiences. It has diplomatic 
relations with Austria, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. In Asia, Bhutan has bilateral 
relationships with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Maldives, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Finland, Norway, Australia, and Thailand. These are more 
formal than intimate, however, and Bhutan does not 
maintain office in many of them. 
 
As its contacts with the outside world increased, Bhutan 
gained more experiences in international politics. Internally, 
various development activities, especially progress in 
education, had great impacts on Bhutanese policy makers. 
These changes enabled the policy makers to define a unique 
security that fitted with its demographic, socio-cultural, and 
geopolitical realities. Apart from military, political, and 
economic aspects of security, Bhutan also considers threats 
to its culture and environment as major security problems. 
Such concerns have effectively been expressed through its 
development philosophy, known as Gross National 
Happiness, which emphasizes the happiness of its citizens as 
the ultimate objective of any development pursuit that it 
undertakes. This philosophy is implemented in the day-to-day 
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activities of the country through the preservation of the 
culture and the environment, the promotion of equitable 
economic development and of good governance. Bhutan has 
increasingly used this philosophy to attract the attention of 
the outside world.  
Explanations to Bhutan’s International Behaviour 
Bhutan’s intimate relationship with India can be explained 
from several perspectives. Bhutan is located in a very 
strategic part of the world. It has the world’s two most 
populous and economically growing countries as its 
neighbours. Given its physical, demographic and economic 
size and the geo-political realities in which it exists, Bhutan is 
in a very precarious situation. Thus, it is the lack of 
economic, military and political capabilities to ensure its 
security that brought about its collaboration with India. India 
provides economic and defense assistance to Bhutan. These 
points suggest the functioning of structural scarcity theory.  
 
Bhutan’s efforts to diversify its international relations are 
rooted in its own national security concerns. Bhutan’s fear of 
confining its international relations to India increased in 
1975, when India overran Sikkim, immediately to the west of 
Bhutan (Chetri 1998, ?). The need to offset Indian domination 
led Bhutan to establish relations with many countries and 
organizations around the globe. Despite its dislike for 
Bhutan’s diversifying moves, India has always restrained 
itself from committing actions that would set the two 
neighbours into conflict. India is aware that any conflicts with 
Bhutan will not be a rational move for it. Bhutan serves as a 
buffer between China and India along part of a very extensive 
border. Besides, since independence in 1947, India has been 
left connected to its northeastern states by a narrow strip of 
land called the Siliguri Corridor, lying between Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) and Bhutan. Most of these states have 
experienced, and continue to experience, active insurgency 
against the Indian central government. Bhutan and 
Bangladesh help protect the narrow corridor that connects 
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these states to the main part of India, and therefore can play 
an important role in India's strategic plans.  
 
Economically, as a landlocked country, Bhutan relies on 
India for access to the sea. India is its major trading partner. 
In 1999, India accounted for 75% of Bhutan’s imports and 
94.5% of its exports. India is the major donor to Bhutan. But 
the economic relationship between the two is not a 
unidirectional one. Although to a lesser degree compared to 
Bhutan’s dependence on it, India also relies on the former for 
economic matters. Apart from helping Bhutan, its 
investments in Bhutan serve to boost the economies of the 
Indian states that border Bhutan. Most of the industries in 
West Bengal now depend on electricity imported from Bhutan. 
Many Indians are employed in Bhutan.  
 
It is apparent from these explanations that it’s the structural 
scarcity that determines Bhutan’s relation with India and its 
behavior in other international behavior. However, contrary to 
structural scarcity theory’s emphasis on the prominent 
nature of the dependency of small states on big ones, we find 
that the big power is also dependent on the small power. As 
structural theory fairly explains Bhutan’s relation with India, 
supporters of this theory would predict that it would hold 
true for any country similar to Bhutan.  
 
Nepal has been chosen for comparison. Like Bhutan, Nepal is 
a landlocked country depending on India for access to sea 
and other economic inputs. However, Nepal is much poorer 
than Bhutan. In 1997, Nepal’s per capita income was US 220 
whereas Bhutan’s was US$ 594.1 Nepal’s per capita 
availability of land and forest resources have deteriorated 
with the increase in population. The situation of 
unemployment has worsened over the years. Its structural 
scarcity is much more severe than Bhutan’s. By the logic of 
the theories, it is expected to have even more intimate 
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relationship with India than Bhutan. Yet its relationship with 
India is a very hostile one.  
 
In the 1950s, Nepal and India had differences over the issue 
of rights of landlocked states to transit facilities and access to 
the sea. In 1969, Nepal asked India to withdraw its security 
check-posts and liaison groups in Nepal. India withdrew very 
reluctantly. Throughout the 1970s, India supported Nepalese 
Congress Party2 to oppose the monarchy in Nepal. In 1987 
India threatened expulsion of Nepalese settlers from 
neighbouring Indian states. Nepal retaliated by introducing a 
permit system for Indians working in Nepal and imposing a 
55 per cent tariff on Indian goods. In 1988, Nepal signed an 
agreement with China to purchase weapons. India retaliated 
by imposing economic sanctions. In 1989, Nepal decoupled 
its currency from the Indian rupee which previously had 
circulated freely in Nepal. Indian retaliation prevented Nepal 
from using port facilities in Calcutta3. In recent times, the two 
have been having disputes over sharing of water resources.  
 
The prediction of structural scarcity theory fails. It does not 
explain the behavior of all small states vis-à-vis their 
neighbours. The case of Nepal also proves that other theories 
such as small powers aligning with the threatening power 
don’t hold true. Bhutan aligns with India while Nepal doesn’t. 
The world systems approach and dependency school which 
emphasize the economic issues as the core of international 
relations, also don’t provide a credible explanation as 
although both Bhutan and Nepal are economically dependent 
on India, they have different form of relations with India. How 
can we then explain the different strategies that Bhutan and 
Nepal adopt towards India?  
 
                                              
2 Nepal Congress Party first came into being in Varanasi, India in 
1940s. It’s formation was supported by Indian Congress Party 
3 Information used here has been taken from 
http:lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/nptoc.html 
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Alternative Explanations 
Examination of the differences in certain basic characteristics 
that Nepal and Bhutan had at that point of time in their 
histories may suggest some explanations to their different 
relations with India. I start by looking at two issues: general 
awareness and the domestic institutions. Although both 
Bhutan and Nepal were considered closed before the 1950s, 
Nepal had frequent contacts with the outside world. Nepal’s 
Prime Minister Jung Bahadur traveled to England in 1850 
and returned convinced of the necessity to have good 
relations with industrialized countries. Since then, European 
architecture and fashion were given popular 
acknowledgement in Nepal. Institutionally, administrative 
procedures and legal frameworks for interpreting civil and 
criminal matters, revenue collection, landlord and peasant 
relations, inter-caste disputes, and marriage and family law, 
were established. These institutions were largely used to 
centralize the power of monarchy.  
  
In the same period, Nepal’s awareness of the world further 
increased through its involvement in different military 
operations with the British army. Nepal offered military 
assistance to the British during the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857 
in India, and its troops fought World War I and World War II. 
The returning Gurkha troops who were now aware of the 
outside world started newspapers, which later became the 
forum of intellectual debate and discussion. Thus, Nepal had 
a high degree of awareness of the outside world and some 
form of institutions when it opened up in 1951.  
 
On the other hand, Bhutan remained completely closed and it 
did not develop any domestic institutions. Until the monarchy 
was established in 1907, it was governed by a very unstable 
form of political institution where the civil and military 
activities were looked after by a temporal ruler and the 
religious activities by a religious ruler. The institution of 
monarchy ensured political stability. The reigns of the first 
two kings were mostly confined to maintaining internal 
Journal of Bhutan Studies 
 
 98
political stability. Its awareness of the outside world remained 
low. The two Kings also did not establish any kind of 
domestic institutions.  
 
The initiatives taken by the Third King in the 1950s suggest 
that Bhutan was by then more aware of the outside world. 
Many political changes were taking place in the region. India 
had gained its independence from Britain in 1947. To the 
north, China had occupied Tibet in 1951. Soon after these 
events, the Third King established National Assembly in 
1953. In the mean time, events in the north were becoming 
more threatening. In 1959, China had taken over Tibet 
forcefully and Dalai Lama fled to India. Bhutan almost 
immediately launched its first five-year plan in 1961. The five-
year system plan was the first formal approach to economic 
development. These developments emanated largely in 
response to the international events taking place in the 
region. Thus, while Nepal already had fairly established forms 
of domestic institutions when it opened up, Bhutan had to 
develop them rather in a short span of time. This suggests a 
close link between domestic institutions and international 
affairs. A weak domestic institution is a source of threat to 
the national security of small states.  
 
Bhutan’s decision to align with India and not with China 
could also be related to the events just described. Bhutan 
viewed China as a revolutionary power. When China took over 
Tibet formally in 1951 and more directly, and forcefully, in 
1959, Bhutan sympathized with Tibet’s fate. As a country 
that shares the same religion and culture as Tibet’s, 
Bhutanese policy makers perceived China in Tibet as posing 
serious threats to Bhutan’s independence and security (Holsti 
1982, 42). On the other hand, Nepalese elites had little 
“empathy for the Buddhist political and cultural system in 
Tibet and demonstrated only minimal sympathy for the fate 
suffered by Tibet” (Rose, 1977. 82). Besides, on some 
occasions in the past China tried to claim suzerainty over 
Bhutan. It published maps, which showed sizeable portions 
of Bhutan as part of Tibet and sent pamphlets preaching 
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Communism into Bhutan from across the border. (Rahul 
1971, 103-105). Nepal never saw as much threat from 
Chinese as Bhutan did.  
 
Bhutan and Nepal differ significantly in terms of the nature of 
political structure and its stability. Democracy was restored 
in Nepal in 1990 but Nepal still faces political instability. 
There have been frequent changes of government. Corruption 
and inter-party and intra-party conflicts are widely prevalent. 
Opposition parties label any initiative by the ruling party as 
selfish and anti-Nepal even though some initiatives would 
benefit the country as a whole. For example, in 1991, the 
opposition party opposed Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s 
initiatives to have close economic and security ties with India. 
Conflicts and feuds among Nepal’s political elites have 
prevented Nepal from developing a consensus policy towards 
India. Besides, many view Nepal Congress Party as an 
extension of the Indian Congress Party. There is an ever-
increasing effort to pursue policies quite different from India. 
In Bhutan, there are no political parties and there had been 
no fight for power among factions or any groups. It enjoys a 
very stable political structure and has been pursuing a 
relationship with India which ensures its economic and 
military security. 
A Comparison of Bhutan’s UN roll call votes with Nepal and India 
So far, we have indicated difference in the behavior of Bhutan 
and Nepal vis-à-vis India and have provided some 
explanations for them. Let us now try to support these claims 
by looking at one specific instance. For this purpose, data on 
UN roll call votes from 1975 to 1985, i.e. from the 30th to the 
40th sessions of the UN General Assembly, has been analyzed. 
Bhutan became a member of the UN only in the 27th session, 
and the first couple of years of its membership was a learning 
period during which it participated in only a few roll call 
votes. Therefore, the 30th session has been taken as the 
starting point of analysis. Data is immediately available only 
up to the 40th session.  
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General Assembly votes take three forms: yes, no or abstain. 
Only those votes in which all three voted were taken for 
comparison. Votes were classified into the following major 
categories: disarmament and nuclear weapons, human rights, 
economic issues, territorial integrity, and international 
security. All the issues related to nuclear weapons, 
disarmament, non-use of force, chemical and biological 
weapons have been included in the disarmament and nuclear 
weapons category; issues related to apartheid, gender and 
religious rights in the human rights category; all the issues 
related economic development and resources under economic 
issues; colonialism and occupation of territories under 
territorial integrity; and issues related UN peace keeping 
forces and international peace conferences and talks under 
international security. A small number of issues, which did 
not fall within these categories, have been left out of this 
analysis. The following table shows the pattern of votes for 
India, Bhutan and Nepal from the 30th to 40th sessions of the 
UN General Assembly. 
 
Disarmament 
& Nuclear 
Weapons 
Human 
Rights 
Economic 
Issues 
Territorial 
Integrity 
Interna-
tional 
Security 
Session Country 
Y A N Y A N Y A N Y A N Y A N 
India 14 1 1 20 0 0 11 0 0 15 2 1 1 0 0 
Bhutan 13 2 1 19 1 0 10 0 0 14 3 0 1 0 0 
30th 
Nepal 16 0 0 15 5 0 11 0 0 16 1 0 1 0 0 
India 10 3 1 23 0 0 22 1 0 21 0 1 5 0 0 
Bhutan 9 4 1 24 0 0 23 0 0 17 1 0 5 0 0 
31st 
Nepal 14 0 0 21 2 0 23 0 0 19 3 0 5 0 0 
India 11 3 0 28 0 0 22 1 0 20 0 1 5 0 0 
Bhutan 11 4 0 28 0 0 23 0 0 19 1 0 5 0 0 
32nd 
Nepal 15 0 0 26 2 0 23 0 0 19 2 0 5 0 0 
Continue next page… 
 
Note- Y: yes; A: abstain; N: no 
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Disarmament 
& Nuclear 
Weapons 
Human 
Rights 
Economic 
Issues 
Territorial 
Integrity 
Interna-
tional 
Security 
Session Country 
Y A N Y A N Y A N Y A N Y A N 
33rd India 13 4 1 32 1 0 30 1 0 19 1 1 17 0 0 
 Bhutan 13 4 1 33 0 0 31 0 0 19 2 0 17 0 0 
 Nepal 17 1 0 26 7 0 30 1 0 17 4 0 16 1 0 
India 12 4 1 28 2 0 20 2 0 27 0 1 11 0 0 
Bhutan 12 4 1 28 1 0 21 0 0 27 1 0 11 0 0 
34th 
Nepal 16 1 0 24 6 0 21 1 0 24 4 0 11 0 0 
India 16 4 2 39 2 1 7 1 0 12 2 1 4 0 0 
Bhutan 17 4 1 38 2 1 6 0 0 13 1 0 4 0 0 
35th 
Nepal 21 1 0 37 5 0 7 1 0 12 3 0 4 0 0 
India 18 7 1 27 1 0 22 2 0 35 2 0 4 0 0 
Bhutan 19 1 1 26 2 0 24 0 0 34 2 0 4 0 0 
36th 
Nepal 21 4 0 24 4 0 22 2 0 32 5 0 4 0 0 
India 30 9 2 34 2 1 31 0 0 29 2 1 6 1 0 
Bhutan 34 4 1 33 4 0 31 0 0 29 2 0 6 1 0 
37th 
Nepal 36 3 0 34 3 0 30 1 0 29 3 0 7 0 0 
India 29 15 2 27 1 0 24 0 0 28 1 0 13 2 0 
Bhutan 40 3 1 25 3 0 24 0 0 27 1 0 15 0 0 
38th 
Nepal 41 5 0 24 4 0 23 0 0 26 2 0 15 0 0 
India 31 12 2 40 1 0 24 1 0 22 1 0 13 1 0 
Bhutan 39 3 1 38 3 0 24 1 0 20 1 0 13 0 0 
39th 
Nepal 40 4 0 34 6 0 24 1 0 22 1 0 14 0 0 
India 31 16 0 33 1 1 29 0 0 24 2 0 14 0 0 
Bhutan 41 4 0 35 1 0 30 0 0 23 1 0 14 0 0 
40th 
Nepal 43 4 0 34 2 0 30 1 0 22 3 0 15 0 0 
India 215 78 13 331 11 3 242 9 0 252 13 7 93 4 0 
Bhutan 248 37 9 327 17 1 247 1 0 242 16 0 95 1 0 
Total 
votes 
Nepal 280 23 0 299 46 0 244 8 0 238 31 0 97 1 0 
Source: UN Roll Call Data, SSDS, Stanford University 
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The above table demonstrates a clear and distinct pattern of 
votes. The number of differences in “Yes” votes is higher in 
the nuclear and disarmament issues. There is a small 
difference in the human rights category too. The three 
countries vote almost in the same manner on other issues. 
For example, the difference in the total number of “Yes” votes 
among the three countries is very small on issues related to 
economic questions, territorial integrity and international 
security. This indicates that a big neighbour does not 
influence a small state’s voting pattern on all the issues. 
Following charts show the pattern of votes described above.  
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No. of "Yes" votes in Economic issues
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Having seen this general pattern, let’s now discuss some more 
specific issues and try to analyze whether the data supports 
the general findings that we have seen, i.e. Bhutan and Nepal 
behave differently vis-à-vis India. We have seen that the 
voting pattern is almost similar on economic, territorial 
integrity and international security issues. But closer analysis 
of votes on disarmament and nuclear weapons issues is 
suggestive. 
 
Analysis of the data shows that Bhutan’s votes on issues 
related to disarmament and nuclear weapons closely follow 
India’s. In fact, Bhutan’s total number of “Yes” votes in the 
32nd, 33rd and 34th sessions are identical to India’s votes. This 
suggests the Indian influence in Bhutan’s voting pattern. On 
the other hand, Nepal’s votes on these issues differ by a large 
margin from India’s. This confirms that Nepal’s international 
politics does not follow India. This supports our argument 
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that the two small states with similar economic and physical 
features, do not behave the same way. 
 
Data also shows a trend that needs further discussion. 
Beginning with 37th session, Bhutan’s voting pattern differs 
from India’s. In the figure below, except for the 38th session, 
the difference in the number of votes between Bhutan and 
India on disarmament and nuclear issues widens and the 
difference becomes greater towards the end of the period 
under review.  
 
Comparison of Bhutan & India's "Yes" votes in 
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As the data showed some interesting trend, issues on which 
Bhutan voted differently from India were analyzed further. 
Analysis shows some counter-intuitive voting behavior by 
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Bhutan. As a small country, one cannot expect it to have any 
ambition to develop nuclear weapons but it abstains in many 
of the issues, which it is expected to support. It even abstains 
on the issues in which India votes “yes”. In the past most of 
its abstentions were on the same issues that India abstained 
from voting. So, how can we account for such a trend by a 
country, which has so far been supportive of India. 
 
Looking into the diplomatic history of Bhutan, this different 
voting pattern of Bhutan coincides with the efforts taken to 
establish its international image. The sessions, which show a 
different voting pattern, fall in the early 1980s(1982, 1983, 
1984 and 1985). During the same period, Bhutan became 
member of several international organizations and 
established diplomatic relationships with countries other 
than India. It joined IMF, World Bank, IDA and FAO in 1981; 
WHO, UNESCO, and ADB, in 1982; and became a member of 
SAARC, UNCTAD and ICIMOD in 1985. In 1985, it also 
established Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva and 
diplomatic relations with Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Norway. The different pattern of Bhutan’s 
voting pattern towards the end of the period under review can 
be attributed to its diversifying diplomatic relations. This is 
highly suggestive of the role of the international organizations  
and the network of diplomatic relations in international 
politics of a state. However, this conclusion needs to be 
qualified. Unless more researches are carried out by 
interviewing Bhutanese foreign policy experts, it cannot be 
concluded for sure that Bhutan has decided to differ with 
India. One could only suggest that Bhutan was very tactful 
and voted different from India only on the issues that India 
wouldn’t care to bother how Bhutan voted. There are enough 
facts to support this argument. Bhutan has followed Indian 
stand on issues that India considers important. Because 
India refuses to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, Bhutan has also not 
ratified them. Bhutan supported India’s nuclear test in 1998.  
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Conclusions 
In conclusion we could say that no single existing theory 
explains the international politics of small states adequately. 
They fail to account for different behavior of two small states 
with similar economic and physical limitations. The level of 
awareness, domestic institutions, culture and the nature of 
political structure and stability determine their international 
behavior. This suggests that there can be no universal theory 
which can explain the behavior of small states with different 
culture, politics, domestic institutions and perceptions of 
security. A next stage of study, involving different experts of 
foreign policies on Bhutan and Nepal, could go a long way in 
confirming the some suggestive explanations provided to their 
different behavior towards India.  
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